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Exploring the symmetries underlying a previously proposed encryption scheme which relies on single-qubit
rotations, we derive an improved upper bound on the maximum information that an eavesdropper might extract
from all the available copies of the public key. Subsequently, the robustness of the scheme is investigated in the
context of attacks that address each public-key qubit independently. The attacks under consideration make use
of projective measurements on single qubits and their efficiency is compared to attacks that address many qubits
collectively and require complicated quantum operations.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum-public-key cryptography, where the public keys
are quantum-mechanical systems, is a largely unexplored area
of problems. Various cryptographic primitives can be defined
in this context (e.g., digital signatures, identification schemes,
encryption schemes, etc) which aim at different goals (e.g.,
integrity, confidentiality, etc) [1–10]. Of particular interest
are quantum-public-key encryption (QPKE) schemes [6–10]
which facilitate the communication between many users over
insecure channels. Typically, a legitimate user participating
in such a QPKE scheme has to choose a random secret (pri-
vate) key, and prepare the public key in a state that is in ac-
cordance with the private key. Many copies of the public-
key state can be created in this manner and become available
to any potential sender in an authenticated manner, e.g. via
a key-distribution center, whereas the corresponding private
key is never revealed and is used by the receiver for decryp-
tion only. In a nutshell, QPKE combines the provable security
of quantum-key distribution (QKD) protocols [11] with the
flexibility of conventional public-key encryption schemes, fa-
cilitating thus the key distribution and the key management in
large networks [10, 12]. Key distribution and key manage-
ment are crucial issues associated with the security and the
efficient operation of large networks, and cannot be solved
efficiently in the context of QKD (followed by a classical
symmetric cryptosystem) or quantum direct communication
(QDC) protocols such as [13–15]. The main reason is that,
by construction, the protocols of QKD and QDC are point-to-
point protocols, and thus the total number of secure links and
keys scales quadratically with the number of users in the net-
work. This power law can be improved if the communications
are performed via a key distribution center (KDC) which pos-
sesses all the secret keys. In this case, however, the center be-
comes an attractive target, while a compromised KDC renters
immediately all communications insecure. In QPKE schemes
on the other hand, the KDC deals with the public keys only,
whereas the private keys are in posession of the legitimate
users [16]. The study of QPKE schemes is also of funda-
mental importance for the field of quantum cryptography be-
cause of the quantum trapdoor one-way functions, which are
essential ingredients not only for the development of efficient
encryption schemes, but also for many other cryptographic
primitives (digital signatures, fingerprinting, zero-knowledge
protocols, etc) [1, 3–5, 12, 17].
The mere fact that in QPKE schemes many copies of
the public keys become available, allows an eavesdropper to
launch new strategies that go beyond QKD and QDC proto-
cols (e.g., see [18]). Although the actual state of the public
key is unknown to an adversary, the multiple copies, when
processed judiciously, may reveal more information on this
state than a single copy. Hence, a security analysis of a par-
ticular QPKE scheme has to address questions related to the
lengths of the private and the public keys, as well as the num-
ber of public-key copies that can become available before the
entire cryptosystem is compromised. Clearly, such questions
are intimately connected to specific aspects of QPKE, which
are not present neither in QKD nor in QDC protocols.
The QPKE scheme of [10] is rather intuitive as it relies on
single-qubit rotations. The public key consists of a number
of qubits that are prepared at random and independently in
some unknown state. A message can be encrypted in one
of the public keys by rotating appropriately the correspond-
ing qubit states and the resulting cipher-state is subsequently
sent for decryption. Due to its simplicity, this scheme may
serve as a theoretical framework for addressing questions per-
taining to the power and limitations of QPKE as well as its
robustness against various types of attacks. In this context it
has been shown recently that any deterministic QPKE requires
randomness in order to be secure against a forward-search at-
tack [18]. Furthermore, in contrast to the classical setting, a
QPKE scheme can be used as a black box to build a new ran-
domized bit-encryption scheme that is no longer susceptible
to this attack.
Here we discuss for the first time a symmetry that underlies
the scheme of [10] and that reduces considerably the infor-
mation that an eavesdropper might extract from the copies of
the public key. Subsequently, we analyze the security of the
protocol against attacks that aim at the encrypted message and
that rely on individual projective measurements on the qubits
of the public key(s) and of the cipher state. It is shown that
the performance of such attacks can be slightly worse than the
performance of the forward-search attack [18] which requires
complicated quantum transformations that are beyond today’s
technology.
2We like to emphasize, that discussions on the scheme of
[10] with an appropriate choice of the parameters also apply
on a specific so-called ping-pong protocol [14] that pertains to
the category of the so-called quantum direct communication
(QDC) protocols. The different context has to be taken into
account to achieve meaningful statements.
This paper is organized as follows: In Sec. II basic as-
pects of the recently introduced quantum-public-key protocol
of [10] are summarized. The influence of symmetric eaves-
dropping strategies on upper bounds of the probability for
an eavesdropper to guess correctly the private key or the en-
crypted message are investigated in Sec. III. Security aspects
of the private key are discussed in Sec. III A on the basis of
Holevo’s bound. In Sec. III B an attack on encrypted mes-
sages is studied, which pertains to individual projective mea-
surements on the qubits involved. As a main result it is shown
that Eve’s success probability converges to the value of one
half exponentially with the numbers of qubits in which the
message is encrypted with a scale depending on the number of
its publicly available copies of the public key. Furthermore, it
turns out that the success probability of this attack differs only
slightly from the already known optimal probability of suc-
cessful state estimation by means of collective measurements.
In addition, as discussed in III C, the resulting lower bound of
the security parameter of the public-key protocol is also close
to the previously derived security parameter of the forward-
search attack of Ref. [18]. Finally, in Sec. III D a symmetry-
test attack with projective measurements is explored, which
attacks the message directly and makes use of only a single
copy of the public-key quantum state and the corresponding
cipherstate.
II. THE PROTOCOL
For the sake of completeness, let us summarize briefly the
main ingredients of the protocol proposed in [10]. Each user
participating in the cryptosystem generates a key consisting of
a private part and a public part, as determined by the following
steps.
1. Choice of a random positive integer n≫ 1. Additional
limitations on nwill be derived in the following section.
2. Choice of a random integer string k of length N i.e.,
k = (k1, k2, . . . , kN ). Each integer kj is chosen at ran-
dom and independently from Z2n , and thus it has a uni-
form distribution over Z2n .
3. The classical key k is used for the preparation of the
N -qubit public-key state
|Ψk(θn)〉 =
N⊗
j=1
|ψkj (θn)〉 (1a)
where
|ψkj (θn)〉 ≡ cos
(
kjθn
2
)
|0z〉+ sin
(
kjθn
2
)
|1z〉, (1b)
while { |0z〉, |1z〉} denote the eigenstates of the Pauli
operator σˆz ≡ |0z〉〈0z| − |1z〉〈1z | , which form an or-
thonormal basis in the Hilbert space of a qubit. The
Bloch vector associated with (1b) is given by Rj(θn) =
cos(kjθn)zˆ + sin(kjθn)xˆ with xˆ, zˆ denoting unit vec-
tors and with
θn = pi/2
n−1 (1c)
denoting the elementary angle of rotations around the
axis with unit vector yˆ.
4. The private (secret) part of the key is k, while the public
part is {n,N, |Ψk(θn)〉}.
Note that, since each kj is distributed uniformly and inde-
pendently over Z2n , the random state |ψkj (θn)〉 is uniformly
distributed over the set of states
H
(n) = { |ψkj (θn)〉|kj ∈ {0, . . . , 2
n − 1}}. (2)
The state of the jth public-key qubit |ψkj (θn)〉 is known if the
corresponding Bloch vector (or equivalently the angle kjθn)
is known. The full characterization of the angle kjθn requires
n bits of information.
In general, a legitimate user should never reveal his private
key, whereas he can produce at will as many copies of the
public key as needed. The number of public-key copies T ′
[19], however, should be kept sufficiently small relative to n
(the precise relation will be discussed in Sec. III A), so that
the map
k 7→ {T ′ copies of |Ψk(θn)〉} (3)
is a quantum one-way function by virtue of Holevo’s theorem
[10, 18]. The one-way property of the map (3) is essential
for the definition of the public-key encryption in the present
framework.
Suppose now that Bob wants to communicate a binary
plaintext m to Alice. The users have agreed in advance on
two encryption operators Eˆ0 and Eˆ1 for encryption of bit ′′0′′
and ′′1′′, respectively. The key point here is that the bits of
the plaintext (message) are assumed to be encrypted indepen-
dently on public qubits that have been prepared at random and
independently (see discussion above). Hence, for the sake of
simplicity and without loss of generality, we can focus on the
encryption of a one-bit message m ∈ {0, 1}. As discussed in
[10, 18], in this case the protocol is not secure when the bit
is encrypted on the state of a single qubit. However, it has
been shown in the context of a forward-search attack, that the
robustness of the protocol increases considerably if m is en-
coded in a randomly chosen s-bit codewordw with Hamming
weight of paritym which is subsequently encrypted on s pub-
lic qubits [20]. Correspondingly, the analysis of the following
section pertains to a one-bit message, which is encrypted in
the parity of an s-bit codeword with s playing the role of a
security parameter.
For the encryption of the one-bit message m ∈ {0, 1}, Bob
chooses at random a codeword w ≡ (w1, w2, . . . , ws) of par-
ity m, and obtains an authenticated copy [21] of Alice’s pub-
lic key (T ′ − 1 public keys still remain publicly available).
3The codeword is encrypted by applying independent succes-
sive encryption operations on the first s public qubits. The
resulting (quantum) ciphertext is thus the s-qubit state
|Xk,m(θn)〉 =
s⊗
j=1
Eˆwj |ψkj (θn)〉 =
s⊗
j=1
|χkj ,wj (θn)〉, (4)
to be referred to hereafter as cipherstate. In this spirit, for the
encryption of anL-bit message requires a public-key of length
N ≥ Ls. The cipherstate is sent to Alice who can obtain the
message by means of a decryption procedure whose details
are not essential for our purposes in this work. We only note
here the crucial property that the encryption operations do not
depend on Alice’s private key, but the decryption operators do.
Moreover, to allow for a simple decoding we assume that
Eˆwj |ψkj (θn)〉 → |ψkj (θn + wjpi)〉, (5)
for wj ∈ {0, 1} [22].
The primary objective of an eavesdropper (Eve) in the con-
text of QPKE is to recover the plaintext from the cipher state
intended for Alice. On the other hand, there is always a more
ambitious objective pertaining to the recovery of the private
key from Alice’s public key. A cryptosystem is considered
to be broken with accomplishment of either of the two ob-
jectives, but in the latter case the adversary has access to all
of the messages sent to Alice (see also related discussion in
[10, 12]). It is essential therefore to ensure secrecy of the pri-
vate key, before we discuss the secrecy of a message. In Sec.
III A, we derive restrictions on the parameters n and T ′ so
that the map (3) is a quantum one-way function, and thus the
recovery of the private key from the public keys is prevented.
As far as the encryption of the message (or equivalently the
codeword) is concerned, we note that, in view of Eqs. (1b)
and (5), the two possible values of the jth bit of the code-
word wj ∈ {0, 1} are essentially encrypted in orthogonal
eigenstates of a basis, which is rotated relative to the basis
{ |0z〉, |1z〉} by an unknown angle kjθn. This means that the
cipher-qubit state is parallel (wj = 0) or antiparallel (wj = 1)
to the corresponding public-qubit state. Thus, in the follow-
ing analysis we consider two different classes of eavesdrop-
ping strategies, which aim at the encrypted message. The first
class involves attacks that explore the symmetry between the
public-key state and the cipher state to reveal the message.
The other class pertains to attacks that extract information on
the public key (and thus on the basis on which the message has
been encoded), so that the message can be recovered by means
of a projective measurement on the estimated basis. Clearly,
for this second class of attacks the probability of successful
decryption is expected to increase with the information gain
on the public-key state.
III. SYMMETRIC EAVESDROPPING STRATEGIES
In a single run of the protocol the fixed quantities are the
secret key k (and thus the public key), as well as the code-
word w. In general, for a given eavesdropping strategy, the
probability of successful eavesdropping in a single run of the
protocol P (suc|k,w) differs from the corresponding proba-
bility obtained by averaging over all possible values of k, i.e.,
P¯ (suc|w) =
∑
k
P (k)P (suc|k,w)
=
1
2nN
∑
k
P (suc|k,w), (6)
where for the last equation we have used the fact that k is
uniformly distributed over {0, 1}nN . The one-bit message
m is encoded at random on one of the 2s−1 possible s-bit
codewords with parity m (examples are given in [10, 18]).
Hence, the conditional probability for the codeword w to oc-
cur, given a particular value of m ∈ {0, 1}, is P (w|m) =
2−(s−1). However, from the point of view of an adversary,
both values of m ∈ {0, 1} are equally probable and thus
P (w) =
∑
m P (w|m)2
−1 = 2−s i.e., the codewords have
a uniform distribution over {0, 1}s. Therefore, the eavesdrop-
ping strategies we are going to discuss are symmetric with
respect to all possible codewords [23], and thus we also have
P¯ (suc) ≡ 2−s
∑
w
P (suc|w) = P (suc|w).
A. Eve’s point of view
Our first task is to find out how much information Eve may
extract from τ available copies of the jth public qubit, and in-
vestigate the conditions under which the security of the private
key is guaranteed.
From Eve’s point of view, the state of the jth public qubit
is uniformly distributed over H(n), with the corresponding a
priori probability being 2−n. Hence, the density operator de-
scribing the state of τ copies of the jth public qubit is
ρ
(τ)
j,prior =
1
2n
2n−1∑
k′
j
=0
[
|ψk′
j
(θn)〉〈ψk′
j
(θn)|
]⊗τ
=
1
2n
2n−1∑
k′
j
=0
|Φ
(τ)
k′
j
(θn)〉〈Φ
(τ)
k′
j
(θn)| , (7)
where |Φ(τ)
k′
j
(θn)〉 := |ψk′
j
(θn)〉
⊗τ
. In the space of τ -qubit
states we have τ + 1 different subspaces each of which is
spanned by all B(τ, l) =
(
τ
l
)
eigenstates with the same Ham-
ming weight l, i.e. the same number of qubits which are in
the state |1z〉. Within one of these subspaces, say Sl, we can
define the fully symmetric state
|l〉 =
B∑
i=1
|i〉l/
√
B(τ, l),
where the sum runs over all the τ -qubit eigenstates with the
same Hamming weight l. The problem can be formulated en-
tirely in terms of these (τ + 1)-symmetric states { |l〉 : l =
0, 1, . . . , τ} [24].
4Using Eq. (1b), we have
|Φ
(τ)
k′
j
(θn)〉 =
τ∑
l=0
√
B(τ, l)fτ,l(kjθn) |l〉, (8a)
with
fτ,l(kjθn) =
[
cos
(
kjθn
2
)]τ−l [
sin
(
kjθn
2
)]l
. (8b)
Thus the density operator of Eq. (7) reads
ρ
(τ)
j,prior =
τ∑
l,l′=0
Cl,l′ |l〉〈l
′| (9a)
with
Cl,l′ =
1
2n
√
B(τ, l)B(τ, l′)
2n−1∑
k′
j
=0
fτ,l(kjθn)f
⋆
τ,l′(kjθn). (9b)
In the appendix A we provide additional information on the
form of the a priori density operator ρ(τ)j,prior as well as on
some observations regarding its rank and eigenvalues. What
we have so far, however, suffices to provide an upper bound
on the von Neumann entropy S[ρ(τ)j,prior] for any values of τ
and n. In particular, instead of saying that τ copies of the jth
public-key qubit are distributed, we can say that one copy of a
larger (τ+1)-dimensional system becomes publicly available.
Hence, we have
S[ρ
(τ)
j,prior] ≤ log2(τ + 1). (10)
The state described in Eq. (7) is a convex ”classical” mix-
ture of quantum states { |Φ(τ)kj (θn)〉} which are distributed
with probabilities pj = 2−n. Albeit pure, the states
|Φ
(τ)
kj
(θn)〉 are not mutually orthogonal. As a result the von
Neumann entropy for the density operator ρ(τ)j,prior is strictly
smaller than the Shannon entropy of the corresponding prob-
ability distribution H(pj) = n [17]. The Holevo bound re-
stricts Eve’s average information gain Iav on the unknown
state for τ copies. In particular, the information gain is up-
per bounded by S[ρ(τ)j,prior], and in view of inequality (10) we
obtain the result
Iav ≤ log2(τ + 1). (11)
On the other hand, one still needs n bits of information to
characterize completely the state of the jth qubit (which of
course implies knowledge on the private key as well). So, as
long as
n≫ log2(τ + 1), (12)
the one-way property of the map (3) is guaranteed [25]. Thus
one can be confident that no matter what strategy Eve may
choose, her information on each public-key qubit is very low.
Despite the fact that Eve has almost no knowledge about the
public key she may be able to decrypt an encrypted message
successfully. This will be demonstrated in the next sections.
In closing, we would like to emphasize that in [10, 18] the
symmetries underlying the particular encryption scheme have
not been taken into account and thus a larger upper bound on
Iav was obtained suggesting that Eve can get up to τ bits of
information from τ copies of the public key. However, this
section demonstrates that the actual upper bound turns out to
scale logarithmically with τ so that secrecy of the private key
can be guaranteed already for significantly smaller values of
n. Intuitively, this originates from the fact that the protocol
restricts Eve by construction on the (τ + 1)-dimensional sub-
space of symmetric states for the τ copies of the jth public-
key qubit. In appendix A we provide a tighter upper bound on
Eve’s information gain based on basic properties of the eigen-
values of ρ(τ)j,prior.
B. Incoherent Projective Measurements
Eve knows that all of the qubit states lie on the x− z plane
of the Bloch sphere. Thus, she may try to deduce the mes-
sage by means of projective measurements on the cipherstate
as well as on all of the remaining (T ′ − 1) copies of the pub-
lic key [26]. In the following, we assume that each qubit of
the public key or of the cipher is measured independently. In-
deed, given that the random state of each public-key qubit is
chosen independently and that it is distributed uniformly over
H
(n)
, it is reasonable to assume that there are no hidden pat-
terns that Eve can take advantage of by attacking many qubits
collectively.
One possible strategy for Eve is to obtain an estimate of the
public-key state (1) by measuring half of the public keys on
the (eigen)basis { |0z〉, |1z〉} of the Pauli operator σˆz and the
other half on the (eigen)basis { |0x〉, |1x〉} of the Pauli opera-
tor σˆx ≡ |0z〉〈1z | + |1z〉〈0z| . In this way she can obtain an
estimation on the jth public-qubit state or equivalently on its
Bloch vector Rj . It should be emphasized that such an attack
essentially aims at the private key which, by construction, is
in one-to-one correspondence with the public key. Although,
condition (12) restricts Eve’s information gain on the private
key to negligible values, it cannot guarantee secrecy of the en-
crypted message. Hence, in an attempt to reveal the message
she can measure the cipherstate on a basis defined by her guess
on the corresponding public-qubit state. The main purpose of
this section is to analyze this attack.
Since all public-key qubits are equivalent and independent,
let us start by focusing on one of them, i.e., the jth qubit which
is measured in the basis b ∈ {z, x} with b = z(x) referring
to the eigenbasis of the operator σˆz(σˆx). The two possible
outcomes of these measurements are ”0” and ”1” and they
occur with probabilities
p
(b)
j,0(kj) = cos
2
(
β
pi
4
−
kjθn
2
)
, p
(b)
j,1 = 1− p
(b)
j,0. (13)
In this equation, β ∈ {0, 1} with the correspondences b =
z → β = 0 and b = x → β = 1. Without loss of gen-
erality let us also assume that T ′ − 1 = 2T [26], so that T
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FIG. 1. A posteriori probability distributions (given by Eqs. 14) for T = 8 (a-e), T = 9 (f-h), and various events {T (z)0 , T (x)0 }: (a) T (z)0 = 0;
(b,f) T (z)0 = 2; (c,g) T (z)0 = 4; (d,h) T (z)0 = 6; (e) T (z)0 = 8.
6measurements are performed on the basis b. Let T (b)0 denote
the number of outcomes ”0” from measurements in the b ba-
sis. In a single run of the protocol Eve obtains a particular set
of outcomes {T (z)0 , T
(x)
0 } out of T 2 different possible combi-
nations. We will first discuss how much information she can
obtain about the public-qubit state (or equivalently the private
key).
1. Information gain on the public-qubit state
The a posteriori probability for the j-th qubit state is given
by Bayes law
pj(k
′
j |T
(z)
0 , T
(x)
0 ) =
qj(T
(z)
0 , T
(x)
0 |k
′
j)
2nq(T
(z)
0 , T
(x)
0 )
. (14a)
The probability for the outcome {T (z)0 , T
(x)
0 } to occur given
the input state |ψk′
j
(θn)〉 is
qj(T
(z)
0 , T
(x)
0 |k
′
j) =
(
T
T
(z)
0
)(
T
T
(x)
0
)
×
×
∏
b
[
p
(b)
j,0(k
′
j)
]T (b)0 [
p
(b)
j,1(k
′
j)
]T−T (b)0
,
(14b)
and
q(T
(z)
0 , T
(x)
0 ) =
1
2n
2n−1∑
k′
j
=0
qj(T
(z)
0 , T
(x)
0 |k
′
j). (14c)
A sample of a posteriori probability distributions is depicted
in Fig. 1, for T = 8, T = 9, and various events {T (z)0 , T
(x)
0 }.
Different public-qubit states may give rise to a certain combi-
nation {T (z)0 , T
(x)
0 } albeit with different probabilities. Hence,
given a particular combination of ”0” outcomes in the two
bases, the conditional a posteriori probability distribution ex-
hibits peaks for public-qubit states (as determined by kjθn),
which are consistent with the particular event under consider-
ation.
Eve’s information gain is given by the difference of the
Shannon entropies of the distributions before and after the
measurements, i.e.,
Iav = Hprior − 〈Hpost〉
= n+
∑
T
(z)
0
∑
T
(x)
0
q(T
(z)
0 , T
(x)
0 )×
×
2n−1∑
k′
j
=0
pj(k
′
j |T
(z)
0 , T
(x)
0 ) log[pj(k
′
j |T
(z)
0 , T
(x)
0 )] (15)
where we have summed over all possible outcomes for a given
state. The entropy of the a priori uniform probability distri-
bution is equal to the entropy of the private-key bit kj . As
depicted in Fig. 2, this information gain is slightly below the
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Entropy of a priori probability distribution
(=entropy of private key), Holevo bound and information gain as
functions of the number of public-key copies 2T that become avail-
able. The value of n affects considerably the a priori probability dis-
tribution. The inset shows the difference between the Holevo bound
and the information gain.
Holevo bound of Eq. (A2) for τ = 2T , which is tighter than
the bound of Eq. (10). It is worth mentioning that although
the information gain depends weakly on n the Holevo bound
does not. In the subsequent discussion the choices of n and T
are such that the inequality (A2) and thus also inequality (10)
are satisfied for τ = 2T .
2. Probability of correct guessing the message
As we have seen in the previous subsection, a particular
outcome {T (z)0 , T
(x)
0 } of a single run of the protocol allows
Eve to update her knowledge on the public-qubit state she may
have been given. From her point of view the a posteriori state
pertaining to τ public-key copies is given by
ρ
(τ)
j,post(T
(z)
0 , T
(x)
0 ) =
2n−1∑
k′
j
=0
p(k′j |T
(z)
0 , T
(x)
0 )×
× |Φ
(τ)
k′
j
(θn)〉〈Φ
(τ)
k′
j
(θn)| . (16)
Tracing out τ − 1 copies, we obtain for the single-copy
density operator the expression
ρ
(1)
j,post =
∑
k′
j
p(k′j |T
(z)
0 , T
(x)
0 ) |ψk′j (θn)〉〈ψk′j (θn)| (17)
and the corresponding (estimated) Bloch vector
R˜j =
∑
k′
j
p(k′j |T
(z)
0 , T
(x)
0 )[cos(k
′
jθn)zˆ + sin(k
′
jθn)xˆ] (18)
with ||R˜j || 6= 1.
Recall now that the one-bit message m is encoded in the
parity of an s-bit codeword w which is subsequently en-
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FIG. 3. (Color online) Conditional probability P (suc|wj , kj) for
n = 10 and various values of T .
crypted on s public qubits. Let us calculate first Eve’s prob-
ability to recover the bit wj in a single run of the pro-
tocol by measuring the corresponding cipher qubit in the
basis defined by R˜j . For the particular encryption under
consideration (see Sec. II) her probability of success is
P (suc|wj , kj , T
(z)
0 , T
(x)
0 ) = cos
2(Ωj/2) with Ωj denoting
the angle between the actual Bloch vector Rj and its estima-
tion R˜j . Hence, we obtain
P (suc|wj , kj , T
(z)
0 , T
(x)
0 ) =
1
2
+
R˜j ·Rj
2||R˜j||
=
1
2
+
1
2||R˜j||
∑
k′
j
p(k′j |T
(z)
0 , T
(x)
0 ) cos[(k
′
j − kj)θn] (19)
with Rj defined in Sec. II. For a given public-qubit state var-
ious outcomes may occur albeit with different probabilities
P (suc|wj , kj) =
∑
T
(z)
0
∑
T
(x)
0
P (suc|wj , kj , T
(z)
0 , T
(x)
0 )×
×q(T
(z)
0 , T
(x)
0 |kj). (20)
The typical behavior of P (suc|wj , kj) with kj (or equiva-
lently kjθn) is depicted in Fig. 3 where we have an oscillation
around the mean value
P¯ (suc|wj) =
1
2n
∑
kj
P (suc|wj , kj). (21)
As we increase the number of public-key copies the ampli-
tude of the oscillations becomes smaller and the mean value
increases. In particular, we find that for T > 1
P¯ (suc|wj) . 1−
1
6T
:= U(T ). (22)
As depicted in Fig. 4, this performance is very close to the
optimal probability of successful state estimation by means of
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FIG. 4. (Color online) Conditional probability P (suc|wj) for n =
10 and various values of T .
collective measurements [27]
P¯opt(suc|wj) =
1
2
+
1
22T+1
2T−1∑
i=0
√(
2T
i
)(
2T
i+ 1
)
(23)
which scales like
P¯opt(suc|wj) ∼ 1−
1
8T
. (24)
Bagan et al. [28] have demonstrated that this upper bound
can be saturated by means of individual measurements and
our attack has similarities to their approach. Finally, for
our subsequent discussion it is worth keeping in mind that
P (suc|wj) does not depend on the actual value of the bit wj
i.e., P (suc|wj = 0) = P (suc|wj = 1).
Up to now our results are referring to one bit of the code-
word only and our task is to obtain the probability of success
in guessing correctly the bit-message m from the s-bit code-
word w. Since the message is encoded on the parity of the
codeword, Eve succeeds even if she fails to predict correctly
α out of s bits with α even. Instead of considering her prob-
ability of success in a single run of the protocol, which is a
rather complicated task, we concentrate in the following on
her probability of success averaged over all possible public-
qubit states (or equivalently private keys k). As depicted in
Fig. 3, for large T the amplitude of the oscillations is at least
an order of magnitude smaller than the mean. Hence, any con-
clusions based on the average probability of success are also
expected to apply with good accuracy to a single run of the
protocol. Since each bit of the codeword is encrypted sepa-
rately in independently prepared public qubits, the averaging
over all possible values k is straightforward. Thus, one ob-
tains for the average probability of successful eavesdropping
for a given message m and codeword w
P¯s(suc|m,w) =
s∑
α=0
even
(
s
α
)
[1− P¯ (suc|wj)]
α ×
×[P¯ (suc|wj)]
s−α. (25a)
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FIG. 5. (Color online) Average probability of success P¯s(success)
as a function of codeword length s, for n = 10 and various values
of T . The solid lines are numerical results obtained from Eqs. (25),
whereas the dashed lines are for the upper bound defined in Eq. (26).
Averaging over all possible equally probable codewords and
messages we finally find
P¯s(suc) = P¯s(suc|m,w). (25b)
In Fig. 5, P¯s(suc) is depicted as a function of the codeword
length s for various numbers of public-key copies (solid lines).
Clearly, the average probability of success decreases with in-
creasing swhereas this drop becomes slower and slower as we
increase the number of public-key copies. For T > 1 a rather
tight upper bound for P¯s(suc) is given by the expression
1
2
+
1
2
(
1−
1
3T
)s
(26)
which is also plotted in Fig. 5 with dashed lines. A sketch of
the proof of this upper bound is provided in Appendix B.
Now, let us assume that the users participating in the pro-
tocol have agreed in advance on a security parameter ε ≪ 1
so that Eve’s probability of success P¯s(suc) has to fulfill the
relation P¯s(suc) ≤ 1/2+ ε. This implies that the message bit
m has to be encrypted in
s ≥
∣∣∣∣∣ 1 + log2(ε)log2 ( 3T−13T )
∣∣∣∣∣ (27)
qubits which is always fulfilled if
s ≥ 3T |1 + log2(ε)|. (28)
C. Comparison to the forward-search attack
The robustness of the present public-key encryption scheme
against a forward-search attack based on a symmetry test in
which Eve compares the cipher state with the public-key state
is discussed in Ref. [10, 18]. The symmetry test of Ref.
[10, 18] takes into account all the copies of the public keys
but in contrast to the attacks discussed here it requires rather
complicated quantum operations and gates, such as Fourier
transformations and permutations on large numbers of qubits.
Due to the nature of the attack the probability for successful
eavesdropping does not vary from run to run and the probabil-
ity for an eavesdropper to deduce the parity of the s-bit code-
word and hence the message from the cipherstate is given by
[18]
P¯s(suc) =
1
2
+
1
2
(
1−
1
2T
)s
. (29)
It is rather surprising how close this exact expression is to the
upper bound (26), which is slightly below the optimal proba-
bility of success. For a given security threshold ε the length
of the codeword has to satisfy
s ≥ T |1 + log2(ε)|. (30)
which differs from Eq. (28) by a factor of three only.
D. A symmetry-test attack with projective measurements
In contrast to the previous attack we will consider here an
attack which aims directly at the message rather than the pri-
vate key and makes use of one copy of the public-key state and
the cipherstate only. Eve pairs up the corresponding qubits
of the public key and the cipher state i.e., the jth pair per-
tains to the jth qubits. The qubits of the jth pair are pro-
jected independently onto the same randomly chosen eigen-
basis { |0ϕj〉}, |1ϕj〉} where
|ζϕj 〉 = (−1)
ζ cos
(ϕj
2
)
|0z〉+ sin
(ϕj
2
)
|1z〉 (31)
and ϕj is uniformly distributed over [0, 2pi). The probability
of correct guessing either of the qubits is given by
F (kjθn, ϕj) ≡ |〈ψkj (θn)|ζϕj 〉|
2 = cos2
(
kjθn − ϕj
2
)
.(32)
However, since for a fixed value of kj the angle ϕj is cho-
sen at random, we can introduce a new random variable
ωj,n ≡ kjθn − ϕj uniformly distributed over the interval
[0, 2pi). For later convenience let us also denote the number
of wrong outcomes for the jth pair by ej with 0 ≤ ej ≤ 2.
As discussed in the last paragraph of Sec. II, the question that
Eve has to answer is whether the states of the qubits in the
jth pair are parallel or antiparallel. She obtains the correct an-
swer if the outcomes of the measurements on the correspond-
ing two qubits are either both correct (ej = 0) or both wrong
(ej = 2). Thus, the probability of success in a single run of
this protocol is given by
P (suc|wj , kj) = [F (ωj,n)]
2 + [1− F (ωj,n)]
2. (33)
If the one-bit message is encoded in the parity of an s-bit
codeword which is subsequently encrypted on s qubits, Eve’s
strategy succeeds provided the total number of incorrect out-
comes e =
∑s
j=1 ej is an even integer (e.g., see Table I for
9public key t,t t,f t,t t,f f,t f,f f,t f,f
cipher state t,t t,f f,f f,t t,f t,t f,t f,f
e1,e2 0,0 0,2 1,1 1,1 1,1 1,1 2,0 2,2
e 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 4
TABLE I. Encryption of a single bit, on the state of two qubits (s =
2). Possible combinations of true (t) and false (f) outcomes that lead
to correct estimation of the message.
s = 2). The total probability of success in a single run can
be obtained by means of an iteration of the form (B3), where
Q(s) is a multivariable function, i.e., Q(s)(ω1,n, . . . ωs,n) ≡
Ps(suc|k,w)). Hence, Eve’s probability of success in getting
the correct parity and thus the correct message consists of two
parts pertaining to possible combinations of outcomes from a
single pair and the remaining s− 1 pairs. More precisely, the
first term refers to the case where the overall result on s − 1
pairs as well as the result on the single pair are correct whereas
for the second term Eve has failed in both cases.
Given that the probability Ps(suc|k,w) is a function of s
uncorrelated random variables ωj,n, its analysis for s > 2
is rather cumbersome. Nevertheless, it is straightforward to
obtain an analytic expression for the average probability of
success P¯s(suc) by averaging over all possible keys and code-
words which is equivalent to averaging over all possible com-
binations of {ωs,j}. Along the lines of Appendix B it can be
proven that
P¯s(suc) =
1
2
+
1
2s+1
. (34)
Again, the average probability of success drops exponentially
with increasing values of s. In contrast to Eqs. (26) and (29),
this expression does not depend on T since the attack under
consideration uses only one copy of the public key. It is,
however, equivalent to the corresponding expression for the
forward-search attack, i.e. Eq. (29) for T = 1. Hence, for a
given security threshold ε the length of the codeword has to
satisfy inequality (30) for T = 1.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We have analyzed the security of a quantum-public-key
encryption (QPKE) scheme that relies on single-qubit rota-
tions. For a given number of public keys the symmetry un-
derlying the protocol has been shown to restrict consider-
ably the information gain that an eavesdropper might gain
on the private key. This result suggests that new more effi-
cient QPKE schemes could rely on quantum one-way func-
tions, which explore symmetries in the involved quantum
states. It is also worth recalling here the pivotal role of sym-
metries in quantum-key-distribution protocols, as a result of
which qudit-based protocols can tolerate higher error rates
than qubit-based ones [30].
The robustness of the protocol under consideration was
mainly analyzed in the framework of an attack which takes
into account all the public-key copies and is based on projec-
tive measurements on single qubits. As a main result it has
been shown that the performance of this attack is comparable
to the performance of optimal collective measurements [27]
as well as to the forward-search attack of [18] which involves
rather complicated quantum operations. Variants of the attack
are expected to be applicable to other types of QPKE schemes
as well.
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Appendix A: Properties of the density operator (9).
As for the matrix elements of the density operator of Eq.
(9), we can distinguish two different cases:
Case 1: If l + l′ is an even number, the function
fτ,l(kjθn)f
⋆
τ,l′(kjθn) has even parity and does not change
sign as we sum over all possible values of kj ∈ Z2n . Hence,
we expect a non-zero contribution of Cl,l′ in this case.
Case 2: If l+l′ is an odd number, the elementCl,l′ vanishes
since the parity of the overall trigonometric function in the
sum is odd.
Another important property of the density operator (9) is
that for fixed value of τ there seems to exist a critical value of
n, let us say nc, for which it is n-independent for all n ≥ nc.
Furthermore, we have studied the rank of the density operator
as well as the form of its eigenvalues for various values of n
and τ . Our simulations show that for fixed τ , rank[ρ(τ)j,prior] <
τ + 1 for all n < nc and thus the density operator is singular,
whereas for n ≥ nc, rank[ρ(τ)j,prior] = τ + 1.
The von Neumann entropy of a quantum state is bounded
from above by log2(D) with D denoting the dimension of
the support of the relevant density operator. In view of the
hermiticity of ρ(τ)j,prior we have D = rank[ρ
(τ)
j,prior] and thus
for a given pair of (τ, n) the entropy of the density operator is
bounded from above by the corresponding entropy for (τ, nc).
Hence, we arrive again at the upper bound for the entropy
provided in (10).
In order to obtain a tighter bound we can investigate eigen-
values of the density operator for (τ, nc). Our simulations
suggest that in this case the eigenvalues of (9) are given by
λi =
1
2τ
(
τ
i
)
. (A1)
So, S[ρ(τ)j,prior] can be calculated as the entropy of the binomial
distribution with mean τ/2 and variance τ/4. This entropy is
bounded from above by the entropy of the the normal (Gaus-
sian) distribution with the same mean and variance [29]. Thus,
we obtain the result
S[ρ
(τ)
j,prior] ≤
1
2
log2(τ) +
1
2
log2(pie/2) (A2)
10
and this bound is below the one of (10). Accordingly, the
information gain is upper bounded by
Iav ≤
1
2
log2(τ) +
1
2
log2(pie/2). (A3)
Appendix B: Proof of the upper bound (26).
The quantity we want to bound from above, i.e. P¯s(suc),
is a monotonously increasing function of P¯ (suc|wj) for
P¯ (suc|wj) > 1/2. Thus, in view of (22) we have
P¯s(suc) =
s∑
α=0
even
(
s
α
)
[1− P¯ (suc|wj)]
α[P¯ (suc|wj)]
s−α (B1)
≤
s∑
α=0
even
(
s
α
)
[1− U(T )]α[U(T )]s−α. (B2)
Let us denote the r.h.s of inequality (B2) byQ(s)(T ). It can
be shown by induction that Q(s) is equal to (26). To this end
we note that Q(s) can be written alternatively in the form of
an iteration, i.e.
Q(s) = Q(1)Q(s−1) +
[
1−Q(1)
] [
1−Q(s−1)
]
. (B3)
For s = 1 the equality we want to show holds, i.e. we have
Q(1) = U(T ) =
1
2
−
1
2
(
1−
1
3T
)
:=
1
2
+
λ
2
. (B4)
Assuming that it holds for s, i.e.
Q(s) =
1
2
+
λs
2
, (B5)
we can prove also that it holds for s+ 1, because
Q(s+1) =
(
1
2
+
λ
2
)(
1
2
+
λs
2
)
+
+
(
1
2
−
λ
2
)(
1
2
−
λs
2
)
(B6)
=
1
2
+
λs+1
2
. (B7)
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